2.7 — The Political Economy of Trade Policy — Readings
Thursday, October 29, 2020 and Tuesday, November 3, 2020
Required Readings:
- Caplan, 2007, “The Myth of the Rational Voter”
- Somin, 2014, “When Ignorance Isn’t Bliss”
- Buchanan, 1984, “Politics Without Romance”
- Mitchell, 2013, “The Pathology of Privilege: The Economic Consequences of Government Favoritism”
Optional Readings
- Grossman and Helpman, 1994, “Protection for Sale”
- Baldwin and Magee, 2000, “Is trade policy for sale? Congressional voting on recent t?”
Helpful:
- Public Choice
- The Logic of Collective Action
- Government failure
- Rational ignorance
- Rent seeking
- Regulatory capture
Questions To Help Your Reading
- Why is good governance a public good, subject to a free rider problem?
- What is “rational ignorance”?
- What is Caplan’s idea of “rational irrationality” and how is it different from “rational ignorance?”
- According to Caplan, what are the four systematic biases?
- Why do people vote or not vote? How do people that do vote choose how they vote?
- What is the principle of “concentrated benefits and dispersed costs?”